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Abstract
The state-centric theory of forced migration presents the nation-state as the ultimate
sanctuary of citizen rights. It posits that forced migration results from state instability,
which is caused by geopolitical or national identity conflict. In either case, it contends
that the sources of forced migration are exogenous to the state. This paper argues that
under certain conditions the state becomes an endogenous cause of refugees and
internally displaced persons. These conditions occur when the state deploys violence
to dominate society. Using the case of Afghanistan, we document that since 1973 a
series of Socialist, Islamist, and Capitalist regimes have engaged in violent development:
coercive material modernization and social modernity which led to societal resistance
followed by state repression and forced migration. This recurring pattern calls into
question the state as protector of citizens and instead suggests that the state causes
forced migration under conditions of state-society incompatibility.
Keywords
Forced migration, Refugees, Afghanistan, State building

The prevailing theory of forced migration assumes that
refugees and displaced persons are an episodic aberration in an
otherwise functional nation-state system. In this state-centric model,
the state is portrayed as the guarantor of security through the
institution of citizenship (Betts and Loescher 2011; Owens 2011). To
explain forced migration, the theory identifies an exogenous cause that
disrupts the ability of the state to protect its citizens. From the 1950s
through the 1980s, this cause was thought to be decolonization and
super-power proxy wars (Gordenker 1987; Loescher 1989; Zolberg,
Suhrke, and Aguayo 1989). Explanations of forced migration then
shifted from international geo-political conflict between states to
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internal societal conflict that led to state failure (Keely 1996; Toft
2007).
While not altogether dismissing the state's role as a guarantor
of citizens' rights, we argue that under certain conditions the state
itself produces refugees, internally displaced persons, and other
victims of forced migration. Drawing on the state-society relations
literature (Castells 2004; Focault 1995; Touraine 1971, 1977; Weber
1964), we argue that forced migration can become endogenous to the
state because the state as an organizational form was from the
beginning an institution that encoded domination and resistance into
its most basic structure. Using the case of Afghanistan since 1973, we
document one cause of state-society incompatibility which we term
violent development. We define violent development as the state’s
coercive transformation of material conditions (modernization) and
social institutions (modernity). These violent changes to society
produce forced migration. But they also produce popular resistance by
non-state actors. The state then applies additional coercion and this
repression leads to more forced migration.
We select Afghanistan as a case for three reasons. First,
Afghanistan is the single-largest source of refugees since World War II
and accounts for about one in four of all refugees on earth. Second,
forced migration in Afghanistan is frequently attributed to causes
exogenous to the Afghan state, such as geopolitical conflict or ethnic
rivalry. Third, since 1973 a series of different regimes--Socialist,
Islamist, and Capitalist--have attempted to create various states in
Afghanistan. All efforts resorted to repression as they failed,
producing millions of Afghan refugees and displaced persons. By
documenting a reoccurring pattern of violent development in
Afghanistan, we demonstrate that state-society incompatibility is a
cause of forced migration overlooked by the state-centric theory
which focuses on the state as a guarantor of citizen rights.
THE STATE-CENTRIC THEORY OF FORCED MIGRATION
The UN's first Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees
only applied to refugees in Europe who fled events occurring before
January 1, 1951 (UNHCR 2000). It assumed that forced migration
would become rare in the new and more stable nation-state system.
The 1951 Convention thus defined a refugee as a person who "owing
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to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion,
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political
opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable to or,
owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of
that country" (UNHCR 2000:23).
This definition's emphasis on state persecution and national
borders appeared self-evident given the forced migrations in Europe
during World Wars I and II (Marrus 1985). But in 1964, the number
of refugees in Africa and Asia surpassed those in Europe. In 1967, the
UN's Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees removed the
geographic and time limitations from the 1951 definition (UNHCR
2000). By 1990, the number of refugees had fallen below the number
of internally displaced persons (IDPs): people forced from their
homes--but who do not cross an international border--due to local
violence that is ignored, condoned, or even fomented by their state
(IDMC 2008). Eight years later, the UN adopted the Guiding
Principles on International Displacement (Cohen and Deng 1998). By
2009, the global ratio had surged to 26 million IDPs and 16 million
refugees, while some 9 million people were not considered nationals
by any country and thus "stateless" (UNHCR 2009a).
The close connection between refugees and the state was
identified in the early 1990s (Hein 1993) and it remains central to
social science and public policy thinking about forced migration.
According to the UNHCR (2000:276) : "The current structure of
refugee protection was designed in and for a state-centric system."
This model draws heavily on political science classics such as
Aristotle, Hobbes, and Arendt to argue that states benefit society
through the institution of citizenship (Owens 2011). As summarized
by Betts and Loescher (2011:6):
The normative basis of the state system is the idea
that all people have a state that is responsible for
ensuring their most basic rights and protection.
The most salient characteristic which connects
different categories of the vernacular "refugee" is
not geographical movement per se [emphasis in
original] but rather the inability or unwillingness of
the country of origin to ensure citizen's protection.
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According to this state-centric theory of refugee production,
an event beyond the state's control prevents it from carrying out its
function to protect citizens. Decolonization and the Cold War were
once cited as the primary causes of state instability and thus forced
migration (Zolberg, Suhrke, & Aguauo 1989). With the end of the
Cold War explanations shifted to various forms of societal conflict
that lead to fragile, failing or failed states (Toft 2007). The first booklength analysis of IDPs (Cohen and Deng 1998) argued that "wars
within states often reflect a crisis of national identity in a society" (6)
and thus "most conflicts that lead to mass displacement have a strong
ethnic component" (22). The UNHCR (2000:275) agreed, stating that
with the end of the Cold War "the ideological motivation for conflict
diminished. Often, it was replaced by identity-based conflicts built
around religion, ethnicity, nationality, race, language or region."
Based on this review of policy and social science models of
refugees, we draw two conclusions about the state-centric theory of
forced migration that are very similar to those of Haddad (2008):
1) The state is a defining feature of forced migration since a refugee
has to have a state to flee from to have refugee status;
2) The state is also seen as the guarantor of citizens' rights.
We draw two additional conclusions that are not found in Haddad's
(2008) "between sovereigns" thesis since she focuses on how refugees
are constructed as "others" to reinforce state sovereignty. The statecentric theory of forced migration implies:
3) The nation-state system is a mechanism that can prevent or at
least limit refugee production;
4) Post-World War II refugee production is due to geopolitical
events or identity conflicts that are exogenous to the state.
While recognizing that the state does play an important role in
protecting citizens, we argue that the state itself becomes a source of
refugee production when state-society relations are incompatible.
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STATE-SOCIETY COMPATIBILITY IN THE NATION-STATE
SYSTEM
The modern nation-state system was first formulated in
Europe by the Treaty of Westphalia (1648) to end the Thirty Years
War. The watershed year of 1648 culminated many trends favoring the
view that the rights of citizens derive from the sovereignty of the
territorial state, which offers citizens protections and liberties. Perhaps
the greatest development was the Enlightenment's notions of
individual freedoms from oppressive feudal authority (Israel 2011).
The Enlightenment produced a political model which held that
human rights are inalienable rather than based on wealth and power,
such as in a plutocracy, oligarchy, feudal lords, and emperors. Since
these elites came from society, the growth of the state as the guarantor
of rights implied that the more the state was autonomous from society
the more rights it could provide for all people now conceptualized as
a nation or "country" (Somers 2008).
Given that more than nine-tenths of human history passed
before the state evolved, a system which posits that states are
autonomous from society and should have primacy over society will
lead to a tension in state-society relations. The tension between state
and society is managed by what Weber (1964) calls the state monopoly
of violence whereby non-state actors are prevented from using
coercion thus protecting citizens. In the Weberian state, the
deployment of such violence is legitimate simply because it is
sanctioned by the state. Its legitimacy is in fact consecrated when the
state's authority is challenged by non-state violence, which is deemed a
threat to what the state calls "law and order."
By virtue of the state's monopoly over violence, states
attempt to centralize ever more power which produces resistance
from non-state actors (Touraine 1971, 1977). In political-sociological
terms, the state's centralization of power triggers societies’ default
mode of decentralization and thus a contradiction in state-society
relations. Often this struggle takes the form of social movements that
push back the “disciplinarian state’s” (Focault 1995) occupation of the
Habermasian lifeworld (Castells 2004) or what Bourdieu (1990) calls
objective “field” and even his subjective habitus.
We use the above insights about the incompatibility of statesociety relations to identify the set of conditions under which the state
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becomes an endogenous cause of forced migration. We term these
conditions violent development by which we mean the state’s coercive
transformation of material conditions (modernization) and/or social
institutions (modernity). This coercive social change causes forced
migration but it also yields popular resistance by non-state actors. The
state then applies additional force and this repression leads to more
forced migration.
IS THE STATE THE SOLUTION OR CAUSE OF THE
WORLD’S BIGGEST REFUGEE CRISIS?
In one of the first overviews of the Afghan refugee crisis,
Centlivres and Centlivres-Demont (1988:71) remarked: "The case of
the Afghan refugees is unique in the twentieth century: they make up
the greatest population of the same origin ever transplanted outside of
their own borders." The same could still be said twenty years later.
Estimates of the proportion of all living Afghans who have been
refugees at one point in their lives range from one-third to 64 percent
and possibly even two-thirds, but even using the lowest figure "more
Afghans have lived as refugees than any other population in the
world’s recent history" (Kronenfeld 2008: 57).
A comparison with other refugee crises helps us appreciate
the magnitude of forced migration in Afghanistan. In no year since
1981 has any refugee group outnumbered Afghans (UNHCR 2000).
During the peak of the Mozambique refugee crisis in 1992 (1.3
million) there were 4.6 million Afghan refugees. At the height of the
Rwanda refugee crisis in 1994 (2.3 million) there were 2.7 million
Afghan refugees. When the Bosnian refugee crisis erupted in 1996
(893,000) there were 2.7 million Afghan refugees. Although more than
4 million Afghans returned to their homeland from 2001 to 2005,
some 3.5 million remained abroad, suggesting that the Afghan refugee
population numbered almost 8 million at its peak (Kronenfeld 2008).
Other sources estimate the peak number to be 8.3 million (Margesson
2007). In 2009, Iraq became a leading source of refugees (1.9 million).
But there were still 2.8 million Afghan refugees (UNHCR 2009b).
A wide range of causes have been invoked to explain the
Afghan refugee crises (see table 1). Some focus on the cultural
characteristics of Afghan society which have historically promoted
migration and a disregard for states and international borders. Others
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emphasize geo-political conflict in which violence inside Afghanistan
serves the interests of neighboring states and superpowers. Still others
argue that state failure is the underlying cause since without a strong
national government there is no check on local warlords.

In the wake of 9/11, the state failure argument gained many
adherents (Rotberg 2002; Fukuyama 2004). They unambiguously
stated that Afghanistan needed a strong central state to
counterbalance the chaos in society. Cramer and Goodhand
(2002:885) argued that "neither peace nor economic development will
hold without a centralized, credible and effective state, that the
emergence of such a state is a political problem more than a technical
problem, and that it will depend on a monopolization of force by the
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state." According to Suhrke, Harpviken, and Strand (2002: 875):
"Rebuilding the coercive capacity of the state is essential to overcome
strong centrifugal tendencies." Wimmer and Schetter (2003:525)
agreed and stated: "The programme of reconstruction should have a
clear strategic focus and be designed as a state-building project. The
main problem Afghanistan faces is the absence of a monopoly of
power and of other basic state functions." Afghanistan was deemed so
deficient that it required a completely new nation-state:
It is worth distinguishing state building—the
creation of the institutional capacity to govern—
from nation building, which involves bringing
together disparate and antagonistic social groups
in a common government. But in cases like
Somalia and Afghanistan, both are necessary, and
the two probably have to be attempted at the
same time (Engelhart 2003:19).
Evaluations of US nation-state building in Afghanistan
suggest they have failed (Nurussaman 2009; Rashid 2008). But we also
draw a larger lesson: they failed because they pursued a policy of
violent development quite similar to that of previous regimes. In the
remainder of this paper, we account for the Afghan refugee crises
since 1973 by documenting a recurring pattern of incompatibility in
state-society relations. We periodize our argument using five phases of
violent development. For each period we identify the state actor, state
name, state goal, and primary societal groups that were targets of
violent development (see table 2).
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VIOLENT DEVELOPMENT I: THE PDPA AND MARXISMLENINISM
The People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA),
founded by Noor Muhammad Taraki in 1965, was a political
progenitor of the anti-monarchist movement in Afghanistan (Tarzi
2008). It supported Sardar Mohammad Daoud Khan, then Prime
Minister of Afghanistan. Although a cousin of the Afghan King
Mohammed Zahir Shah, Daud was a republican in his political
outlook. In a clandestine pact with the PDPA, he deposed the
monarch when the latter was on a visit to Italy, declared Afghanistan a
republic, and became its first president.
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Daud was fully backed by the PDPA in all of his moves from the
monarch’s deposing to the declaration of Afghanistan as a republic.
The PDPA immediately unrolled its own agenda to build a
democratic Afghanistan out of the ashes of its monarchical past. It
violently purged major government institutions, including the military
and civil service. It then attempted to replace religion with MarxistLeninist ideology as a prelude to economic modernization.
But the PDPA was an urban social movement and had lost
touch with the reality of Afghan society (Ewans 2002). Rural Afghans
resisted modernization and modernity, but not for ideological reasons.
For centuries they had organized themselves into economically and
socially self-sufficient extended families, clans and tribes independent
of a nation-state. In a giant leap of time, they were now thrown under
the growing weight of an ever-expanding republic that violently
pursued control over their private and public lives. Impatient with the
slow pace of republican modernity under the Daoud government, the
PDPA staged a coup in April 1978 to speed up the process of
modernization and modernity. President Daoud, together with 22 of
his family members, was assassinated and dumped in an unmarked
mass grave. The PDPA fielded its founding leader Noor Mohammad
Taraki to become President. He installed two of his comrades,
Hafizullah Amin and Babrak Karmal, as his deputies.
Soon after assuming the Presidency, Taraki signed a Treaty of
Friendship with the Soviet Union and then launched radical reforms
that encompassed not only the urban centers of Afghanistan but its
remote rural districts as well, where they met with resounding
rejection (Rubin 2002). Undaunted, Taraki continued with his
modernity agenda and renamed the “Republic of Afghanistan” the
“Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.” The Taraki government came
down hard on the rural population for their putative backward
religious beliefs. Its chief targets were the clergy and tribal chiefs, for
whom Taraki had unreserved contempt.
The PDPA, however, could not stay united because Afghan
society was split along ethnic lines (Tarzi 2008). The Pashtun faction
called itself the PDPA-Khalq (Pashtu for masses) and non-Pashtun
took the name PDPA-Parcham (Persian for flag). Then a further split
developed in the PDPA-Khalq, dividing it into the Red Khalq
(adherents of Taraki) and the Black Khalq (followers of Hafizullah
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Amin, Taraki’s deputy). Eventually, this divide took Taraki’s life as
well as that of Amin. By late 1979, the Soviets no longer trusted their
proxies and sent the first contingent of 20,000 troops to Kabul to take
direct control, eventually increasing the number to 120,000 (Ewans
2002).
VIOLENT DEVELOPMENT II: THE USSR AND SOCIALIST
MODERNIZATION AND MODERNITY
The Soviets chose Babrak Karmal as their puppet and put
him in the Presidential Palace. For the Soviets, Afghanistan itself
meant little. They wanted to use Afghanistan as a stepping stone into
neighboring Balochistan, Pakistan’s coastal province on the Arabian
Sea (Harrison 1981; Rais 1986; Hopkirk 1992). Landlocked Soviet
Republics needed access to the year-round warm waters of the
Arabian Sea and by extension the Indian Ocean. The Soviets’ ultimate
goal was to establish an unrivaled maritime presence over the Persian
Gulf, including the key shipping lane at the Strait of Hurmoz and the
Strait of Malacca (Niazi 2008). At the time, the only Western naval
presence on the Indian Ocean was a British base in Diego Garcia, to
which the U.S. had access as well.
To achieve this goal, the Soviets first needed to put down the
growing Afghan resistance movement. They attempted to counter the
movement with modernization, portraying the farmers, herders, and
religious authorities who resisted them as economically unproductive
and primitive (Kakar 1995; Rubin 2002). In contrast, they presented
socialist development as a means to usher medieval Afghanistan into
the 20th Century. The benefits of socialist development were assumed
to be a modern economy and society on par with Iran and Pakistan.
Unlike the Taraki regime, the Soviets argued that economic
modernization should precede modernity (the social transformation of
Afghanistan). They initiated major projects in the country’s
agricultural, industrial and mineral sectors of the economy. In
addition, gigantic modernization projects included the fabled Salang
Pass, irrigation in the Helmand Valley, road networks, and new
telecommunication infrastructure. As part of modernity, Marx and
Marxism came to dominate the curricula in educational institutions,
pushing traditional religious instruction into the background.
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Both modernization and modernity, however, threatened
Afghans’ traditional culture, subsistence economy, hundreds of years
of history and customary practices, and were fiercely resisted. In 1989,
the Soviets retreated in humiliation, leaving the country in the hands
of Afghan physician Dr. Najibullah Khan. In 1992, the Khan
government fell as his top military commanders began to defect to the
anti-Soviet "freedom-fighters" who were waiting in the wings to form
an Islamic government.
VIOLENT DEVELOPMENT III: THE JAMIAT-HIZB AND
ISLAMIC COMMUNITY
While militarily effective, the freedom fighters were hardly
unified. Their two major religious parties mirrored traditional Afghan
social divisions (Shahrani 2008). The Jamiat-e-Islami, led by
Burhanuddin Rabbani, was dominated by ethnic Tajiks. The Hizb-eIslami, led by Gulbadin Hekmatyar, was dominated by ethnic
Pashtuns.
To minimize conflict, Pakistan brokered a peace deal between
the Jamiat and Hizb for power-sharing in the post-Soviet Afghanistan
(Rashid 2000). Although Pakistan had long favored the Pashtundominated Hizb over the Tajik-dominated Jamiat, the deal it brokered
gave the Jamiat the upper hand in the interim. Under the deal, both
parties were to share power until the mutually agreed elections were
held within one year to choose a permanent government. In the
interim, Rabbani became President and Hekmatyar Prime Minister.
Despite their differences, Rabbani and Hekmatyar agreed on
one thing: they should rename the country the “Islamic Republic of
Afghanistan.” As Islamic modernists, they also agreed to reverse the
Soviets' development model in which modernization preceded
modernity (social transformation). Instead, they gave primacy to
culture over the economy (Kakar 1995). This sequential reversal in the
development agenda reflected the lack of expertise and material means
to initiate modernization (i.e., material transformation of society in its
economy and economic infrastructure). On the other hand, they were
quite conversant with low-cost or no-cost cultural transformation.
For the Jamiat-Hizb alliance, Islamic modernity meant state
control over human behavior to cultivate "virtue" and eliminate "vice"
with violent enforcement when necessary. They first purged what they
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called "communists" in Afghan institutions. This witch-hunt triggered
the forced migration of hundreds of thousands of middle and uppermiddle class Afghans to neighboring countries, Europe, and North
America (Shahrani 2008). But the major casualty was the Afghan
feminist movement (one of the rare bright legacies of the Soviets)
which was completely ousted from the country (AzarbaijaniMoghaddam 2004). Some feminists took refuge in Pakistan, and their
resilient survival is a remarkable event of Afghan history that deserves
a full accounting of its own.
These violent purges were followed by institutional change.
Schools and curricula were returned to Islamic tenets and the limited
media technology amplified a nation-building message using the
concept of “Umma” (Ewans 2002). Best translated as "Islamic
community," Umma as a doctrine attempts to transcend social
variation, such as national identity, among Muslims and build in its
place a universal solidarity around a common faith.
Afghans did not object to the idea of Umma, as Islamic
communitarianism fit well with traditional Afghan society in which
individual interests were subordinate to communal interests. But they
did resist the building of an Islamic nation-state, which they found
divisive and exclusionary within the Afghan social context. For
instance, Hazaras, who subscribe to the Shiite faith and number
approximately 1.5 million of the Afghan population, felt excluded
from the Sunni-dominated Islamic modernity project (Shahrani 2008).
This exclusion led to resistance in central Afghanistan.
There were also ethnic splits among Sunnis. Pashtuns, as the
founders of Afghanistan, considered it their birthright to rule the
country (Rashid 2000). They could not imagine, let alone accept, a

non-Pashtun (Tajik) President served by a Pashtun Prime
Minister. In the mid-1990s, this simmering conflict erupted into
a civil war that killed 20,000 Afghans (Shahrani 2008).
Eventually, the Rabbani government fell in 1996. A far more
hard-line group of Islamists took its place. They were the first
generation of Afghan refugees who had fled the Taraki and
Soviet regimes. Religiously trained in seminaries in Pakistan,
they were known as the Taliban (students).
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VIOLENT DEVELOPMENT IV: THE TALIBAN AND
ISLAMIC ORTHODOXY
The Taliban entered Afghanistan in 1996 and based
themselves in Kandahar, the traditional center of Pashtun power
and the birth place of Mullah Omer, the movement's founding
leader (Rashid 2000). They then advanced on Kabul, which was
already deserted by the crumbling Jamiat-Hizb coalition
government. After entering Kabul, the Taliban captured Dr.
Najibullah Khan, the last Afghan "Communist" ruler. Khan was
publically tortured to death and his mutilated body hung from a
tower in the main square of the city for three days before he was
allowed a Muslim burial.
Like the Jamiat-Hizb coalition of Islamists, the Taliban
had nothing to offer Afghans that would improve their material
standard of living. They rather opted for ideological state
centralization via religious orthodoxy (Rashid 2000). They set
out on their “transformative agenda” by tinkering with the
country’s name – the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. To them
a republic was a transgression against Islam. Borrowing its
nomenclature from the United Arab Emirates (UAE), one of
their sponsors, they named the country the “Islamic Emirates of
Afghanistan.” But the Taliban took more than nomenclature
from the UAE. They also incorporated and internalized its
religious conservatism. Combined with their literalist
interpretation of Islam, the Taliban set out to create a
disciplinarian state that quickly triggered another wave of forced
migration, especially from northern, eastern, and central
Afghanistan (Shahrani 2008).
Under the Taliban, Afghanistan degenerated into a
virtual prison, especially for women (Rashid 2000). The Taliban
banned women from working outside their homes, although, in
an ironic twist, they allowed them to beg in public. To enforce
these and other regulations, the Taliban state created an army of
young Virtucrats. These zealots used TV antennas to beat
women who dared step out of their homes unescorted. The
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Taliban state also outlawed male sports, such as cricket and
football, and replaced them with violent public entertainment
orchestrated by the Virtucrats. Each Friday, “adulterers” and
“adulteresses” were brought to the Sports Stadium in the heart
of Kabul and stoned to death by the watching crowd.
Not content to hold sway in Kandahar and Kabul, the
Taliban pushed into northern Afghanistan, where leaders of the
Jamiat-e-Islami and its supporters had retreated and established
their internationally recognized capital in Mazar-i-Sharif (Rashid
2000). The Taliban mounted several offensives against the city,
but were repulsed. Finally, in 1998, they captured Mazar-i-Sharif
and massacred thousands of prisoners and civilians. Among the
many consequences of the Taliban's almost total control of
Afghanistan was increased international recognition by other
Islamic social movements. One of them was al-Qaeda founded
by Osama Ben Laden, whom the Taliban welcomed after his
expulsion from Sudan. Ben Laden turned Afghanistan into a
training ground for al-Qaeda, his global terrorist network. After
the 9/11 attacks, the US demanded that the Taliban turn Bin
Laden over. They refused. In September-October, 2001, the US
launched an air blitzkrieg and within weeks dislodged the
Taliban.
VIOLENT DEVELOPMENT V: US-NATO AND
CAPITALIST MODERNITY AND MODERNIZATION
Before the first US soldier set foot in Afghanistan, the
Taliban, Bin Laden, and al-Qaeda had already fled. Since then,
US and NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) troops
have sought to keep them from returning by creating a new
Afghan state (Jones 2006).
The early US victory was only made possible through a
partnership with the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance (NA), of
which the Jamiat-e-Islami was the dominant force (Chayes
2007). Not surprisingly, US forces were beholden to the NA for
its military support against the Taliban. But the US-NA
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partnership did not sit well with nationalist Pashtuns because
the NA is dominated by ethnic Tajiks. The NA's hostility
towards the Taliban is shared by many Pashtuns, but Pashtuns
regarded the NA as an anti-Pashtun force. It is noteworthy that
most of the Taliban are Pashtuns, but all Pashtuns do not have
allegiance to the Taliban. Nonetheless, Pashtuns continue to be
suspect in the eyes of US and NATO forces, as well as nonPashtun Afghans.
These social contradictions presented insurmountable
challenges to the US-NATO effort at nation building and state
centralization (Tarzi 2008). The US and NATO have diligently
worked to build the Afghan military, paramilitary, police, and
civil service. Yet the institutions they have created are marred by
ethnic imbalances. For example, the ethnic Tajik minority is
disproportionately overrepresented in the Afghan National
Army and Afghan Police, while the ethnic Pashtun plurality is
disproportionately underrepresented in these institutions. The
significance of these social contradictions does not register with
western observers who assume state institutions operate by
bureaucracy, not ethnicity.
Yet Afghan society requires members of clans and tribes
to share resources with kith and kin regardless of national law.
What is nepotism to the state is custom to the ethnic group, in
this case, the Tajiks. Pashtuns, who constitute 45 percent of the
national population, can hardly be expected to support national
institutions which benefit rival ethnic groups. Pashtuns' real or
perceived exclusion from state institutions does not augur well
for peace-building because it is inhibiting the return of millions
of Afghan refugees in Pakistan and Iran. The expansion of the
US-NATO mandate into nation- and state-building has ignored
what Kagan (2012) now describes as a primer for U.S. foreign
engagements: history. First, US-NATO forces assumed the
existence of an Afghan national identity which transcends
ethnic, religious, and regional divisions. Second, they
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consistently ignored the group interests of clans and tribes in
favor of individual interests.
The most glaring example of failed nation-state building
by US-NATO is the introduction of national elections. For
centuries, Afghans have had a robust local democratic forum of
Loya Jirga (the grand assembly of elders) in which each tribe and
faith has due representation (Rubin 2002). This Jirga serves as
the electoral college, as well as the highest forum of consultation
on matters of national importance (Niazi 2007). One-personone-vote runs counter to this centuries-old institution. Yet as
evidenced by the 2009 presidential election, it was only with the
blessing of the Jirga that President Karzai won a second term in
office. Although the US and NATO alleged that the election
was fraudulent, it merely reflected the profound influence of the
Afghan social system that was being challenged by a transplant
of the state system unknown to Afghan society.
All of the US-NATO’s efforts at nation-building were
accompanied by massive spending on Afghanistan’s economic
modernization. Just the U.S. alone spent $38 billion in 20012009 on the country’s infrastructure-building that included,
among others, the development of agriculture, water reservoirs,
roads, schools and private sector businesses (Tarnoff 2009). To
put this number in perspective, the $38 billion in economic aid
is almost 270 percent of Afghanistan’s annual GDP of $15
billion. Prominent among key U.S. agencies that execute
modernization efforts are the Department of Defense, Agency
for International Development, the Department of State and the
Department of Agriculture. These efforts, however, are resisted
with insurgent violence in which members of construction
crews are routinely kidnapped or killed, and schools are regularly
bombed, not to mention that NATO forces come under
insurgent attacks on a daily basis. This top-down development is
meeting bottom-up violence. The result is collateral damage in
fatalities and forced migration, when security forces raid villages
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to hunt insurgents or insurgents attack villagers for aiding
security forces.
The futility of this experimentation has caused a change
of heart even among those who were once ardent advocates for
such efforts. A case in point is Robert Kagan, who fervently
supported U.S. efforts at nation-building in Afghanistan as well
as Iraq. In his latest book, he cautioned the United States against
engaging in any such effort without due regard to the history of
the place (Kagan 2012). The Obama administration seems to be
listening. It has now moved away from building a Good
Afghanistan to a “Good Enough Afghanistan” (Sanger 2012).
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
The state-centric theory of forced migration was
codified by the UN in 1951 and it remains the dominant model
for understanding refugees, displaced persons, and other people
who flee political violence. According to this theory, the state
protects citizens unless it is destabilized by some external force.
The refugee and forced migration studies literature has
documented one exogenous cause after another: decolonization,
the Cold War, the War on Terrorism, ethnic rivalry, national
identity conflicts, and most recently "chaos" that leads to fragile,
failing, or failed states. But there is a blind-spot in this approach
because the theory privileges the state over society. Although
the state will always play some role as a guarantor of protection
for its citizens, we have argued that the state itself becomes an
endogenous cause of forced migration under certain conditions.
These conditions occur when the state creates incompatible
state-society relations and then uses force to maintain them.
To empirically document incompatible state-society
relations, we analyzed coercive modernization and modernity in
Afghanistan under three very different regimes. Whether the
regime was Socialist, Islamist, or Capitalist, there was a similar
pattern of violent development. Forced migration resulted
because the state forced society to change in ways that violated
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preexisting material practices and social institutions. But forced
migration in Afghanistan continued because non-state actors
resisted state domination. State repression of this resistance
produced more refugees and displaced persons. The fact that
such different regimes engaged in such similar behavior
supports our contention that the causes of forced migration can
become endogenous to the state rather than the type of regime
produced by exogenous factors.
Additional evidence that forced migration can result
from state-society incompatibility is the wide variation among
the groups persecuted by the state as it engaged in and then
reinforced violent development. In some phases of violent
development in Afghanistan the state targeted rural and religious
segments of civil society. In other phases the targets were the
middle class and comparatively secular urban populations.
Several regimes targeted women and/or specific ethnic
populations and religious faiths. The fact that virtually every
group in Afghan society has been subject to state persecution at
some point since 1973 suggests that the underlying mechanism
of forced migration in Afghanistan is state domination of
society. Inter-state conflicts and intra-society rivalries merely
determine who wins the state and with it the power to enforce
violent development.
There are some historical features of Afghanistan which
may limit the generalizability of our conclusions, such as the fact
that the British wanted Afghanistan to serve as a buffer state
rather than an ideal of the modern nation-state. Nonetheless, we
justify our focus on Afghanistan in two ways. The first reason is
methodological and the second theoretical.
The case study method which we have pursued is
particularly appropriate for research on forced migration. While
refugees and internally displaced persons are a global
phenomenon, they are also highly concentrated. More than twothirds of all refugees originate from Afghanistan, Iraq, Sudan,
Somalia, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (UNHCR
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2009a). Three countries account for 45 percent of the world's
internally displaced persons: Sudan, Columbia, and Iraq (IDMC
2009). Thus rather than develop a universal theory that attempts
to account for all forms of forced migration, it is
methodologically appropriate to identify a set of conditions that
explain the largest and longest crises. Estimates of more than 8
million Afghan refugees have led some observers to call the
crisis the biggest since World War II or even the biggest of the
twentieth century. In conventional social science terminology, it
would indeed by quite an accomplishment if a causal
explanation (violent development) accounted for 25 percent of a
dependent variable (the proportion of Afghan refugees among
all refugees).
Theory is the second and most important reason for
focusing on Afghanistan. The prevailing explanation of forced
migration emphasizes causes external to the state. This theory
has been applied to Afghanistan since the 1980s. Numerous
books and journal articles attribute Afghan refugees and
displaced persons to state instability due to ethnic strife,
religious divisions, inter-state conflicts, and civil wars. The most
recent line of reasoning argues that "chaos" has caused the state
to fail. All of these arguments have some validity but they miss
the larger pattern. Since 1973, a series of regimes have created
an incompatibility between state and society by engaging in
violent development. Forced migration will continue in
Afghanistan, and the world, whenever the state dominates
society through the deployment of violence.
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